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 In recent years, the issue of Arctic sovereignty was most inflamed by a game of football 
played atop the North Pole, which passed unnoticed in the United States, yet in Canada set in 
motion forces that inflamed the public and even influenced the course of a federal election.  In 
November 2005, an ominous rumbling and cracking disturbed the pristine ice of the North Pole; 
with sudden abruptness, the American submarine USS Charlotte surfaced, shattering the icecap.  
Its crew got to enjoy 18 hours of “ice liberty,” dancing about on the ice and even setting up 
floodlights to break the unceasing Artic night and play a game of football.  The resulting 
publicity photographs and press releases trumpeting of the technological achievement received 
little notice in the United States, where a single photo of the submarine surrounded by ice made 
its way along the newswire.  Americans might have been surprised, then, to learn of the furor 
that erupted in their neighbor to the North.  A commentator in Canada’s most read newspaper 
direly warned that the transit of the Charlotte to the North Pole, which presumably occurred 
through Canadian-claimed waters and without the permission or knowledge of the Canadian 
government, was an indication that “Canada’s territorial integrity is at stake.”1  In the midst of 
campaigning for federal elections, both the sitting prime minister and his opponent were forced 
to address the issue.  The challenger, whose party took a hard-line nationalistic stance and made 
Arctic sovereignty a key issue, became the next prime minister. 
While concerns about sovereignty over the Arctic have played a role in contemporary 
elections, the issue has a varied history that stretches back centuries.  Originally believed to 
contain the fabled Northwest Passage, the region’s strategic importance has been repeatedly 
refashioned in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  It generated interest as potentially 
unclaimed land during the last throes of imperialism, as a strategic asset and security concern 
during two hot world wars and one cold one, as an emblem of the international environmental 
                                                
1  “Not Standing on Guard in the North,” Toronto Star, December 29, 2005. 
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movement, and finally, coming full circle, as the site of a key shipping channel when the ice 
began to melt and the reality of a Northwest Passage traversable without ice-breaking ships 
loomed on the horizon.  Resting fathoms underneath the surface lay an estimated quarter of the 
world’s untapped petroleum reserves, adding to the interest and intrigue.2 
Historical approaches to Arctic sovereignty have traditionally mainly been predicated 
upon either economic or security concerns.  These approaches, however, can fail to fully account 
for important events in the history of Arctic sovereignty.  Steward of one of the largest and most 
strategically valuable sections in the Arctic, Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic have 
been challenged at various times since the United Kingdom deeded the Arctic region to the 
Dominion in 1880.  Crucial to the dynamics that have shaped how Canada has asserted and 
understood its sovereignty have been American challenges.  Although it no longer harbors 
designs of its own upon most of the Arctic, the United States has long had vested interests in 
either seeing Canada control the Arctic, or in being allowed unrestricted access to it, and, to this 
end, has orchestrated an array of challenges to Canadian control of the region.  Highly mindful of 
defining their sovereignty and even identity in opposition to American hegemony, Canadians 
developed their conception of sovereignty over the Arctic primarily in response to American 
challenges both real and perceived.  While the issue of Arctic sovereignty began as a largely 
imperial proposition, insofar as the Arctic was merely more territory to be gained at the expense 
of other states, it evolved into an issue that struck at the core of Canadian identity, as it was seen 
by expanding segments of the public as a bastion to be held at all costs against American 
aggression and encroachment. 
                                                
2 Canwest News Service, “Arctic Holds Up To 22% of World's Untapped Energy Reserves: U.S. Study,” 
Canada.com, August 12, 2008, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=6d05bd93-3b65-42f5-
818e-7190d513a8e2. 
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In some sense, to view the issue of Arctic sovereignty in this light presents a departure 
from other dominant approaches to analyzing the topic.  American scholars have largely failed to 
discern the overarching importance of the role that the bi-state relationship plays, and Canadians, 
though consistently conscious of it, have only occasionally framed the topic as mainly an issue of 
national identity, which the involvement of the United States certainly forced it to become.  
Traditional historical or even general academic study of the polar regions has looked at several 
major trends in the battle for control of the Arctic, with territorial value, economic worth, and 
national security largely monopolizing the discourse.  More recently, other paradigms, such as 
environmentalism and indigenous peoples’ rights, have also played a growing role in how many 
scholars have chosen to approach the issue of Arctic sovereignty.  Because the number of 
historians to tackle the subject remains small, analyses offered by scholars in the field of policy 
analysis, law, and other fields provides much-needed insight into the Arctic sovereignty 
question.  These individuals have produced some of the most widely referenced works on the 
topic, and no discussion would be complete without giving attention to the views they bring to 
the table.  As with the work of any historian, though perhaps slightly more, these works of 
analysts and legal experts must be considered for context and possible bias, as such products 
often tend or are intended to support one side or another.  However, with a few exceptions, many 
of them take a measured, objective look at the historical component of the issue, and those that 
do so must be given due consideration alongside works of historians. 
 Early views of the Arctic focused mainly on the perceived value of the region 
either as land to be occupied or resources to be exploited.  These have fixated primarily on the 
early division of territory by the Western powers, and upon the subsequent trade that 
characterized the region’s economic value.  General histories of the region are especially apt to 
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take this tack, which eschews most consideration of the minutiae of diplomatic relations in 
favour of a highly distilled picture painted in broad imperialist or economic terms that are easily 
comprehensible to the otherwise uniformed reader.  In The Arctic: A History, Richard Vaughan 
traces the Arctic’s initial appeal as a potential trade route, and later exploitation for other 
economic purposes, such as a font of nearly inexhaustible sources of whale oil for American 
traders, first noted by a Long Island whaler in 1848.3  He also devotes considerable time to 
tracing the external diplomatic machinations that led various powers to carve out territories in the 
Arctic region, and situates the Canadian attempts to assert sovereignty within this.  Canada, in 
Vaughan’s conception, was concerned mainly with “occupying as much of the north as 
possible.”4  Other authors, including Shelagh Grant, have also emphasized economic 
considerations.  Grant highlights the founding of the Canadian Department of the Interior’s 
Northwest Territories and Yukon branch in response to the discovery of oil in the Canadian 
North; he posits that the Canadian government generally only reacted to developments in the 
north or attempted to assert sovereignty if there was some discernible economic motive.5  Grant 
continues, however, by tracing what he sees as an even more important factor in Canadian Arctic 
sovereignty. 
 Two World Wars and the onset of the Cold War prompted scholars to consider the role of 
national security in incidents concerning control of the Arctic.  Grant, in his book Sovereignty or 
Security, looks at the defense interests that drove policy development in the Canadian Arctic 
from the late 1930s to the 1950s.  He sees the emergence of sovereignty concerns as an 
invariable product of security by the 1940s, when Ottawa began to focus more on the Arctic as a 
potential defensive liability.  To his credit, this realization does not come without the 
                                                
3 Richard Vaughan, The Arctic: A History (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007), 168. 
4 Ibid., 266. 
5 Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 14. 
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accompanying awareness of the role that interaction with America played.  Specifically, in 
chapters entitled “The Army of Occupation” and “The Military North,” Grant accurately portrays 
the burgeoning fears of the Canadian government as they watched ever-expanding numbers of 
American military personnel flow north over the border to occupy U.S. or “joint” military 
compounds whose size was increasing at an exponential rate.  Yet, Grant chooses to focus on the 
overall defense decisions made by the Canadian government from 1936 to 1950.  This 
period, from the Second World War to the onset of the Cold War, proved critical, with the 
emergence of the U.S. as a world leader and preeminent military power given by Grant as a key 
factor in the development of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. 
A number of other observers weighed in on the meaning Canadian control of the Arctic 
held for the security of Canada and its neighbors.  Melvin Conant situates the issue in the context 
of Canada’s overall defensive strategy and commitments.6  Published in 1988, his article 
discusses at length such things as NATO commitments and joint U.S.-Canadian defense of North 
America (in a decidedly Cold War tone).  At a time when presence and military control largely 
defined rights, he was not the only one to follow this tack.7  Much in line with Conant’s 
reasoning, J. Gellner makes an argument in the book The Arctic in Question that defense is one 
of the key functions of the Arctic, providing the imperative for Canada to control it.  Gellner, 
writing during the period of détente in the Cold War, contends that the Arctic serves as the glacis 
of the North American continent, a neutral zone separating the U.S. from the Soviet Union.8  As 
such, Gellner mainly views Canadian attempts to assert sovereignty as concerned with defensive 
military strategy, above all else.  Gellner is seconded in the same volume by T.A Hockin and 
                                                
6 Melvin Conant, "The Long Polar Watch: An American Perspective on Canada's Defense 
of its Arctic," American Review of Canadian Studies 18, no. 3 (1988), 370. 
7 Ibid., 371. 
8 J. Gellner, “The Military Task: Sovereignty and Security, Surveillance and Control in the Far North,” in 
The Arctic In Question, ed. E.J. Dosman (Toronto: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1976), 85. 
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P.A. Brennan, who address the defensive military role in determining Canada’s decision to assert 
sovereignty, as well as the region’s economic value.  They believe that Canada’s Arctic territory 
has mostly been influenced by its strategic importance to the protection of North America, 
similar to Gellner’s glacis argument, although they also see economic issues as an “emerging 
imperative,” as the Arctic begins to be eyed as a key transit route in the twentieth century.9 
 It should be noted that the military and national security approach to the Arctic 
sovereignty issue was dominant during the early decades of the Cold War, but received little 
development or attention during intervening decades, as seemingly more pertinent approaches 
were derived by many historians.  More recently this approach has been imbued with new 
relevance as a resurgent Russian Federation has resumed regular bomber flights in the Arctic 
region, sending historians and policy makers back to reviewing old military methods of viewing 
the issue that were derived in the early days of the Cold War.10 
 The Manhattan crisis of 1969 was a key focal point in the development of an 
environmental approach to the Arctic sovereignty issue.  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
environmental issues had been moving to the forefront in locales around North America and 
Europe, so the spectre of massive oil tankers with questionable safety records, not to mention 
every other kind of commercial ship, plying pristine Arctic waters was enough to give many 
activists and concerned citizens pause.  The most visible development that sprung from this, and 
the one frequently visited by historians, was the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, but 
other related environmental concerns also framed much of the debate over Arctic sovereignty at 
                                                
9 T.A Hockin and P.A. Brennan, “Canada’s Arctic and its Strategic Importance,” in The Arctic In Question, 
ed. E.J. Dosman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 113. 
10 Bob Weber, “Russian Bombers Making a Comeback; 'Bears' fly on Regular Long-Range Air Patrols 
Along Canadian, U.S. Arctic Airspace, Records Show,” The Globe and Mail, May 5, 2008. 
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this time.11  Indeed, one of the larger environmental issues was also linked inextricably to the 
issue of national security and defensive capacity: the transit of submarines powered by nuclear 
means, and the potential environmental damage subsequent to any accident or confrontation 
between such vessels.  This posed a serious environmental threat of almost technologically 
unmanageable proportions, and required a strong sovereignty position be developed on 
environmental grounds. 
 Most recently, historians have also turned more attention to the rights of indigenous 
peoples and have argued that this should be the lens used to examine the issue of Arctic 
sovereignty, almost to the point of exclusion of all others.  This course of thinking proceeds from 
a body of scholarship based on the proposition that native rights should be reconsidered and 
given prime importance in any modern re-envisioning of Arctic sovereignty.  Its development 
was aided not only by historians, but by the evolution of native rights advocacy organizations, 
such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, established in 1977 as an international nongovernmental 
organization representing the native Arctic peoples of Canada, Greenland, Russia, and the United 
States.  While not without its merits, the method of examining the issue is not highly nuanced; its 
tenets flow rather naturally from its precepts.  Too, it is almost inextricably political in nature 
and goals as opposed to objectively historical.  Therefore while it certainly merits a mention in 
any review of Arctic history, it shall not receive significant consideration here.12  Some critics 
would contend that other approaches to the subject, such as that of policy analysis, are also 
biased and political in nature, but for those, the distortion exists more in their ends than means.  
                                                
11 For a discussion touching on the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, see Christopher Kirkey, "The 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiatives: Canada's response to an American challenge," International Journal 
of Canadian Studies (1996): 41-59.  For other environmental concerns, see Richard Vaughan, The Arctic: A History 
(Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1994), 239. 
12 For a more detailed overview of some of the thoughts common to this approach, see Richard Vaughan, 
The Arctic: A History (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1994), 239, or the site of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com. 
 Gilman 9 
Works of policy analysis are often used for advancing particular political positions, but the better 
of these works are genuine attempts to better understand the subject, and to that end they contain 
objective renderings of the relevant history.  The histories contained within the indigenous rights 
approach, meanwhile, are fundamentally skewed to focus throughout their narrative on particular 
events, and advance understandings of them that are frequently subjective beyond allowable 
margins.  This accounts for the exclusion of this approach from detailed consideration in the 
preceding discussion. 
 A key element among many of these arguments is the common thread that is either 
missing or minimized.  Although many hint at the role of the American actions, none make the 
connection that these actions constitute the universal characteristic.  From American whalers in 
the Arctic in 1848 to American military personnel in the Arctic in 1948, Canada has long 
followed a reactive method of formulating its Arctic sovereignty policy, and this method is 
almost universally a reaction to the United States.  This transcends the specific elements focused 
on by some historians, such as the territorial concerns at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the defense considerations of the Cold War period, or the environmental concerns of the 1970s 
and beyond.  The dynamic of the relationship between the United States and Canada, and the 
way in which it drove Canada’s Arctic sovereignty policy to develop in opposition to the United 
States, and as a mechanism of its very identity, serves to tie together most all of the significant 
actions taken by the Canadian government over its entire history into one coherent narrative. 
To examine that narrative, this paper undertakes a study of the major events that have 
contributed to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty since 1880, using a combination of documents.  To 
understand the forces at work, it examines the journals of crewmembers and captains of some of 
the key Canadian expeditions to assert sovereignty in the Arctic around the turn of the century, 
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government documents and correspondence from Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, 
media coverage from Canada and the US during a number of key events to demonstrate the 
development of public opinion in Canada, and a number of other relevant primary documents.  
Notably, the focus stays fixed not exclusively, but predominantly, on the eastern portion of the 
Canadian Arctic.  The reasoning for this is twofold.  First, this area is still in some manner 
contested today, and given the currency of the issue, a historical context for this region is all the 
more important.  Second, a narrowed focus was principally necessary because the issues that 
affected the development of Canadian sovereignty in this region are largely distinct from the 
western arena, where singular issues such as the Yukon gold rush and the American purchase of 
Alaska were key. 
There are a number of events that can serve as focal points for an examination of the 
relationship between America and Canada in the Arctic.  Those examined below are among the 
more significant threads, but by no means an exhaustive chronicle.  First, however, it is 
instructive to look at why the Arctic has been historically important and how exactly Canada 
acquired its share of it. 
 Western civilization warmed slowly to the notion that the Arctic could be a useful area.  
From the Roman Empire to the Renaissance, the polar region was demarcated on maps as frigore 
inhabitabilis (“uninhabitable because of cold”).13  During the Age of Exploration, the Arctic 
began attracting serious attention as a possible shortcut to the riches of the Orient.  Actual 
knowledge of the region was scant, however, with a 1492 globe from Nürnberg optimistically 
depicting the Artic as a circular polar landmass surrounded on all sides by clear passage.14  In 
1497, John Cabot was dispatched by the British to locate a trade route over North America to 
                                                
13 E. Pognon, “Cosmology and Cartography,” Arctic 37: 334-40, quoted in Richard Vaughan, The Arctic: A 
History (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007), 36. 
14 Richard Vaughan, The Arctic: A History (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2007), 37. 
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Asia.15  Although he failed miserably in his quest to conquer the Northwest Passage, he did lay 
the groundwork for future British claims to the land that would be known as Canada, managing 
to reach the island dubbed “newfounde land.”16  His attempt to navigate further north of 
Newfoundland was prescient of trips to locate the Northwest Passage for centuries to come, as 
his ship, the Mathew, beset by ice and untenable cold, was forced to turn back to Europe.17  
Returning with five ships the year hence, Cabot met with disaster, another common facet of 
Arctic missions in the ensuing years.  Four ships were never heard from again, and likely took 
Cabot with them to the floor of the sea.18 
Interest in the Northwest Passage waned for almost a century until 1576, when Martin 
Frobisher was dispatched by the English to locate a route to the Indies.19  Failing, he was 
succeeded by John Davis, who with certain serendipity reached the correct entrance to the 
Passage before turning back.  In a historic underestimation of the difficulties of the situation, 
Davis reported “finding the sea all open, and forty leagues between land and land.  The passage 
is most probable, the execution easy.”20  The enormity of his analytical error might be found in 
the fact that no ship would successfully navigate the “easily executable” passage for more than 
three centuries following Davis’ voyage. 
In 1845, Sir John Franklin set out to conquer the Passage once and for all.  His well-
equipped expedition sailed into Lancaster Sound in the summer of 1845, and from thence into 
both thin air and history.  Over thirty rescue expeditions mounted to locate the explorer turned up 
                                                
15 Michael Gruber, “The New Northwest Passage,” Sea Frontiers 16 (1970): 5. 
16 Vaughan, The Arctic, 56. 
17 Gruber, “The New Northwest Passage,” 5. 
18 Vaughan, The Arctic, 56. 
19 Gruber, “The New Northwest Passage,” 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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nothing, though one achieved the distinction of completely crossing the Northwest Passage for 
the first time in recorded history.21 
 By the nineteenth century, however, access to and use of the Arctic was no longer 
confined to intrepid Age of Exploration adventurers seeking glory and trade routes.  European 
and American traders had by this time discovered some of the incredible natural wealth of the 
Arctic.  Whalers plied the waters of the Arctic, hunting bowhead whales by the thousands.  
Trappers and hunters roamed the ice, and more entrepreneurial individuals established mutually 
beneficial relationships with the natives, founding trading posts at newly inaugurated ports and 
paying top dollar for animals such as seal, caribou, walrus, and muskox.  Narwhal ivory in 
particular had been long sought, with a complete tusk being worth as much as a castle, or, in the 
case of two particularly fine examples, the debt of an entire European nation.22  At this juncture, 
ownership of the Arctic (the portion contiguous with North America) was British, though most 
of its primary exploiters were not, nor were they Canadian.23  Though many Norwegian and 
Danish whaling vessels also sailed the seas that were not unlike those closer to their home 
countries, a plurality of the voyages in most of the Arctic were carried out by ships flying 
American colours.24 
 One particular American, apparently without conscious intent, challenged the irresolute 
state that characterized sovereignty in the Arctic.  In 1874, William Mintzer wrote the British 
government with a request to establish a mining operation and related commercial venture in the 
                                                
21 Ibid., 7.  A caveat applies: the rescue expedition looking for Franklin had to itself be rescued and 
transited a certain distance to complete the journey; it did not merit the title of the first complete sea crossing. 
22 William Broad, “It’s Sensitive. Really.” New York Times, December 15, 2005. 
23 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the exact history and manner by which Britain attained de 
facto control of the Arctic regions, or, as shall be seen, to explicate the myriad of border disputes that Britain 
purposefully left unresolved during its stewardship of the Arctic region.  Regardless, the British certainly had a 
greater claim to effective control of the region than any other nation, with the possible exception of its native 
inhabitants, who were content to trade with any European power . 
24 W. Gillies Ross, "Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic: the 'Neptune' Expedition, 1903-04," Arctic 29 
(1976): 93. 
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region around Baffin Island.25  The British government referred the matter to the government of 
Canada, which showed no interest in resolving the question quickly.  Impatient, Mintzer, a 
lieutenant in the Army of Corps of Engineers, decided in 1876 that the diplomatic process was 
superfluous, organized an expedition to travel to the area, loaded a ship with a hold full of 
graphite and mica, and brought it to the United States.26  The response from the Queen’s 
governments on either side of the Atlantic was neither swift nor retributive.  Rather, four years 
after the departure of Mintzer from the shores of Baffin Island, the British transferred their Arctic 
possessions, in total, to Canada.  There are some telling features contained within the Mintzer 
incident, themes that would find themselves repeated for more than a century afterwards.  
Chiefly, a Canadian (and, here, British) action regarding the Arctic was necessitated by the 
actions of an American or America.  Mintzer represented at least the former, and perhaps the 
latter; although it would be denied upon the expedition’s return, press coverage of the 
expedition’s preparations openly reported that it was operating under the auspices of the United 
States’ government.27  Moreover, the incident exemplified the sluggish and lackadaisical nature 
that would characterize Canadian responses to threats to sovereignty over the coming decades 
and century.  Almost universally, they would be reactive in nature, coming only after a sleight 
(generally American) that could not be left unanswered or avoided. 
 Ultimately, because the Arctic held little promise for economic gain, the British 
relinquished any claims on the Arctic regions to focus on more lucrative imperial possessions, 
and the area became a Canadian concern.  The exact borders of the territory that was now 
                                                
25 Thomas C. Pullen, "What Price Canadian Sovereignty?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
113 (1987): 66. 
26 Ibid. 
27 For pre-expedition coverage, see “Another Arctic Expedition,” New York Times, May 31, 1876; for the 
expedition’s return and an analysis of how it operated, see “From the Arctic Regions,” New York Times, October 12, 
1876. 
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Canadian remained open to a certain matter of interpretation.  This was not unintentional or 
unknown to the British, and although Mintzer may have been the primary trigger preliminary to 
the Imperial Order of July 31, 1880, the potential for boundary disputes was one of the reasons 
the region was considered problematic.  In the end, as one author observed, the final language of 
the order was so ambiguous as to be able to include Bermuda, Honduras, and the British West 
Indies were the strict letter of the order in council, rather than its intent, to be followed.28  
Excluding the Colony of Newfoundland, the transfer included “all British territories and 
possession in North America, not already included within the Dominion of Canada, and all 
islands adjacent to any of such territories or possessions….”29  This transfer was ambiguous not 
only in word, but also in regards to known geography.  The Arctic that had just been deeded to 
Canada was not well mapped; an expedition almost a century later – in 1968 – would 
demonstrate that some Arctic charts were off by up to one thousand miles.30  Nor was the 
territory conceived to be of any particular value to either party, as related best by historian E.J. 
Dosman: “‘The object in annexing these territories to Canada,’ a Colonial office memorandum 
noted, ‘is, I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the 
likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada.’”31  Indeed, Canada only took the step of 
creating districts for the newly acquired territory fifteen years later, in 1895, indicating that the 
Arctic was not a priority area for the Dominion government.32   
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, stories began to reach the Canadian 
public of crimes committed by (predominantly American) whalers against the native peoples, 
                                                
28 Ibid., 71. 
29 The Canada Gazette, October 9, 1880, 389. 
30 Gruber, “The New Northwest Passage,” 10. 
31 Edgar J. Dosman, The Arctic in Question (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 14. 
32 Ross, "Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” 88. 
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who were now technically under the care of the government of Canada.33  This, along with the 
discovery of several islands by explorer Otto Sverdrup, which he claimed for Norway, convinced 
the government of Canada that it was time to bring law and order, and unquestioned sovereignty, 
to the North through an official presence.34 
Thusly was conceived the Neptune Expedition.  Traveling to Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay, 
and many points in between during 1903 and 1904, the Neptune brought scientists, 
administrators, and members of the Northwest Mounted Police to Canada’s eastern Arctic for the 
purpose of surveying the region and informing foreign ships and businesses operating there that 
they were under Canadian jurisdiction.  After visiting several whaling stations, the Neptune spent 
the winter of 1903 in Hudson Bay in the company of an American whaler, the Era.  By several 
accounts, the captain of the Era was none too happy to find his ship’s activities, previously 
unregulated, overseen by a new authority.  Nor was the choice of the Era by the Neptune mere 
chance; although it happened to be a convenient choice, the Neptune had come looking for 
American whalers particularly, despite the presence of whaling operations from other states.35  
W. Gillies Ross even posits in his history of the expedition that there was an official decision 
from higher up to focus specifically on American activities.36 
Such a directive, and the overall incident, is reflective of the way in which Canadian 
policy in the Arctic developed in reaction to American incursions in the North.  After wintering 
with the Era and ensuring, to the irritation of its captain, that it would abide by all relevant 
Canadian regulations, the Neptune moved on to visit a number of other whaling stations and 
ships, handing out regulations and informing all it encountered that they were subject to 
                                                
33 Dosman, The Arctic in Question, 15. 
34 Ross, "Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” 88. 
35 Ibid., 96. 
36 Ibid. 
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Canadian law.  Furthermore, in line with the scope of its charter, the Neptune stopped and 
claimed territory anew for Canada at a number of islands along its journey.37   It also engaged in 
a bit of species conservation by imposing a prohibition in the trade or possession of muskox 
skins when the Superintendent of the Mounted Police detachment with the ship saw the amount 
of over-hunting that was taking place without any kind of governmental supervision.38 
The most significant interaction between groups that indicated ultimate Canadian 
sovereignty, though, took place between the Era and the Neptune, when the crew of the whaler, 
apparently viewing the Neptune as the highest authority in the land, contacted Superintendent 
Moodie to complain about disciplinary actions being taken by their captain, George Comer.39  
Comer was ultimately obliged to respond to a summons from Moodie, and “after some talk (not 
cool)” a resolution, in accordance with Moodie’s desires, was reached.40  This was ostensibly 
part of the Neptune’s mission to enforce the law “as in other parts of the Dominion,” but it is 
again significant to observe that Moodie felt compelled to exert his authority over the American 
ship, yet declined to even examine the case of a local Eskimo who admitted to recently killing 
six people near Rankin Inlet.41  Overall, the Neptune expedition must be viewed as a success in 
terms of establishing some form of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, and especially a firm 
signal to American traders and whalers in the area that Canada was in full control. 
Following the Neptune expedition, Canada sent a few more ships throughout the Arctic in 
a bid to assert sovereignty, most notably the Arctic under the command of J.E. Bernier, which 
embarked on a handful of different voyages from 1904 to 1911.  The ship visited various points 
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in an attempt to further maintain some sort of Canadian presence and formally claim all new 
lands encountered.42  This set up a relatively powerful case for Canadian ownership of the Arctic 
region, as the earlier expeditions scouted out appropriate locations for permanent outposts.  
Reports from the expeditions themselves thoroughly document an extensive bid to showcase an 
exhaustive Canadian presence in the region, detailing the deposit of records by the Arctic at 
twenty-nine different locales from 1906 to 1909.43  However, American activity in the Arctic 
failed to cease entirely.  The onset of the First World War reorganized priorities for both nations, 
though, and it was not until 1925 that an event would again bring Canada and the United States 
into conflict over the former’s Arctic sovereignty. 
In 1925 an expedition was announced that was to be a joint effort between Donald 
MacMillan of Bowdoin College and Richard Byrd, then a lieutenant commander in the United 
States Navy.  With support from the United States Navy, the National Geographic Society, and 
other private interests, the expedition sought to survey by air the polar region, with the intent of 
making the first flight over the North Pole.  More concretely, and more importantly for the 
United States, Byrd referenced the possible strategic value of claiming “any land in the 
unexplored area….”44  Specifically, there was interest in the mythical island supposedly seen by 
Commander Robert Peary during his 1906 attempt on the North Pole.45  The preparations for 
such an expedition did not go unnoticed across the border in Canada, sparking no small 
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bureaucratic unrest; the government was alarmed all the more because it had received no official 
statement of intent from south of its borders concerning the expedition, though plans for it were 
being made quite openly, with all attendant publicity.46  American press coverage in particular 
stoked Canadian fears, as American commentators wildly speculated during the build-up to the 
expedition on the chances of uncovering new lands and adorning them with an American flag.  
The historical record is clear in demonstrating the disquiet that this provoked among members of 
the Canadian government.  In multiple memos marked “Secret,” which traveled between officials 
of the Canadian government (and to British representatives in Washington) the crucial point 
mentioned at the opening of each and every one was that officials had caught wind of the 
proposed expedition not through official channels, but through (American) press reports, very 
effectively adding insult to injury.47  Of a particularly disquieting nature must have been a trine 
of articles in the New York Times in April of 1925 (a few of dozens, if not hundreds, of American 
articles covering the planned voyage) that spoke in hushed tones of the plans of Macmillan to at 
last sight Peary’s mysterious island, which was “awaiting a claimant in the Arctic stronghold.”48  
Canadian media also reported on the planned expedition with rapt attention and in no less 
sensational a manner, with the Toronto Daily Star reporting that the explorers planned to find the 
“lost continent” and “claim the ‘continent’ for the United States.”49 
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The prospect of any other country claiming land on one’s border would be jolting, but it 
was all the more so because in the Canadian view all land in the North was theirs.  In theory, 
everything had been transferred to Canada by Britain’s 1880 act, and any remnants were covered 
by the articulation of sector theory.  First proposed in 1904, but given more body in speeches by 
Canada’s Senator Poirier in 1907, sector theory laid out the notion that for the Arctic states, 
sovereignty existed in sectors extending from their longitudinal lines on the east and west to the 
North Pole, and that all lands within, discovered or not, were the property of their respective 
countries.50  As put by Poirier, the area claimed included “all lands that are to be found in the 
waters between a line extending from the eastern extremity north, and another line extending 
from the western extremity north… no one will venture to go up north between these two lines 
and take possession of any land, or any island that may be discovered between its borders and the 
north pole.”51  Sector theory had apparently been embraced by J.E. Bernier, who, during the 
1909 expedition of the Arctic, left a plaque “commemorat[ing] the taking possession for the 
Dominion of Canada of the whole Arctic Archipelago lying to the north of America from long. 
60°W to 141°W up to the latitude of 90°N.”52  In fact, sector theory had been proposed in part 
specifically because of concerns regarding the activities of American whalers and the lack of 
recognition from the American government of Canadian Arctic sovereignty.53  This theory was 
not well received, nor recognized, by the international community.54 
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In light of sector theory, Canada had some very specific and fervent objections to the 
Byrd-MacMillan expedition and its aims.  W.W. Cory, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, felt 
compelled to visit the United States and iterate to the Americans that “the Canadian Government 
thought that Canada’s permission should be obtained” given that the areas to be visited were 
Canadian territory.55  The American response was not reassuring, but Canada had already formed 
an inter-departmental committee, ultimately known as the Northern Advisory Board, to find an 
appropriate solution, and to further strengthen the government’s position by issuing “a statement 
indicating the extent of the is[lands] in the Arctic regions claimed by Canada.”56  Opinion was 
split over which argument most effectively encapsulated Canada’s claims to the Arctic, with the 
Department of the Interior opting for sector theory, and the Justice Department and External 
Affairs arguing that the country should “emphasize [its] occupation and control so far as is 
reasonable” given that other nations, while dismissing sector theory, considered “effective 
control” an acceptable metric for sovereignty.57  Ultimately, Canada used both tactics, standing 
by its sector theory claims and offering to facilitate the Americans’ journey.  Likewise, in a note 
to the American Secretary of State, a British diplomat in Washington, H.G. Chilton, was both 
chastening and welcoming.  Chilton indicated that he had gathered from press reports that an 
American expedition would soon visit “the northern territories of the Dominion,” and further “[to 
the secretary] as you are doubtless aware,” that several outposts of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police in the North stood ready to assist, while the Dominion government “requested me to 
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inform you of their readiness to furnish the expedition with the necessary permits.”58  This was a 
requirement of new legislation that was introduced as a result of the expedition, mandating that 
all expeditions of a scientific or exploratory nature possess a licence to enter the Northwest 
Territories.59  Lastly, the Arctic, again under the command of J.E. Bernier, had been scheduled to 
patrol annually the eastern Arctic beginning in 1922, and was dispatched anew with George 
Mackenzie, the former gold commissioner of the Yukon, to establish a new RCMP post.60 
American deliberations were evolving in tandem with these developments.  The U.S. 
government had thus far opted against any substantive response to the memos issued by the 
Canadian government, for fear of appearing to endorse sector theory by making any sort of 
application for permits.61  It was also feared that this would delay an expedition already late in 
the preparatory stages.  The American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, responded with caution 
to Chilton, soliciting the details of “what constitutes a post of the Royal Mounted Police… and 
the establishment thereof; where such posts have been established; how frequently they are 
visited; and whether they are permanently occupied….”62  Kellogg, here and elsewhere, was 
clearly seeking the grounds to challenge the legitimacy of the Canadian claim to the Arctic. 
For a brief period, officials even debated applying the Monroe Doctrine to Canada, by 
classing the Dominion as a mere extension of British power.63  This course of action was 
ultimately decided against; had it been pursued, it would have been ironic indeed, for a wish to 
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avoid triggering a Monroe Doctrine response has been cited by some historians as part of the 
impetus for the 1880 transfer from Britain.64  This belief was also shared by Canadian officials, 
who saw, looking back from the 1920s, a self-serving move on the part of Britain in transferring 
the Arctic to Canada, not only to free the United Kingdom from potential encumbrances, but also 
to actively shield their territory from other European powers by means of the Monroe Doctrine: 
“The motive beyond the desire to protect Canada, does not appear, nor is it certain that there was 
any, but it is quite possible that the astute minds of British statesmen may have assumed that if 
Canada were the proprietor of all the British possessions on this continent, and made the laws, 
and regulations to govern them, the American Monroe doctrine, could be appealed to, for the 
peaceful settlement of any dispute which might arise with any European country.” 65 
In any case, a Monroe Doctrine formulation was not necessary.  Like Mintzer decades 
earlier, the Byrd-MacMillan expedition chose not to wait for diplomats to iron out the details.  Its 
ships set sail.  Similarly, as with Mintzer, they were able to accomplish much of their mission 
before being interrupted by diplomatic realities.  After the expedition had completed several 
weeks of flight attempts, it encountered the Arctic on August 19, 1925.  Mackenzie promptly 
offered to procure for Byrd the newly required license for work in the Canadian North.  “In full 
uniform,” Byrd responded with an absolute lie, indicating that the expedition had already 
received a permit.66  Though skeptical in the extreme, Mackenzie now had few options, as he 
was unable to make contact with his superiors.  He had Byrd swear again that he possessed a 
permit, with the Arctic’s first officer as witness, and had to be content.67  Upon returning, one of 
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the first actions Mackenzie undertook in Ottawa was to collect affidavits attesting to Byrd’s 
obvious and intentional disingenuousness and file them with his superiors.68 
While this event may seem like a misfire for Canadian sovereignty, it had some effect.  
After the encounter with the Arctic, Byrd ceased flights over the area, and after a short surveying 
side-trip, left the area post-haste.69  Though traditional historical accounts have given a variety of 
reasons for the departure, from mechanical trouble with expedition aircraft to inclement weather, 
D. Dinwoodie makes a compelling case for the incident with the Arctic being the primary reason 
that Byrd and MacMillan cut short their expedition and returned to the United States.70  There, 
they were met with some response, as the Canadian and British governments issued formal 
complaints upon receiving Mackenzie’s report.  Canadian newspapers also inflamed public 
opinion in Canada against the expedition, blazoning headlines such as “American Party 
Trespassed Upon the Canadian Arctic,” and discussing the many unauthorized or outright illegal 
activities of the American expedition, including slaughtering muskoxen (one of the first 
American activities that had seen regulation in 1903).71  The combined response had a noticeable 
effect: the subsequent Byrd missions of the next three years were strict in their observance of 
new Canadian licensing laws.72 
Over the next few years, Canadian officials were “delighted to find that there is no land” 
undiscovered in the polar region to their north.73  With the known land recognized as Canadian 
(save a small island that to this day remains disputed by Denmark), the Dominion faced no 
further significant challenges to its sovereignty on land.  That is, no other countries claimed 
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outright that they might traverse northern territory without Canadian permission.  However, the 
Second World War witnessed a creeping influence from the United States as troop transport 
requirements and defensive strategies were proffered as justification for the building of the 
Alaska Highway and a number of American military bases.  Some feared such encroachments 
augured a perpetual American occupation.  Prime Minister Mackenzie King even informed his 
cabinet that he was of the opinion that “the long range policy of the Americans was to absorb 
Canada.”74  Americans at the time and since then have dismissed such Canadian fears as 
paranoia, but it is not difficult to see how King may have developed such an impression.  One 
American project that was to be a “small air field” in Quebec’s northernmost fringes became a 
massive installation that Canada was obliged to pay seven million dollars to assume ownership 
of following the war, and by 1942 there were 15,000 Americans operating in the Canadian 
North.75  This is a significant figure considering that the total combined population in the Yukon 
and Northwest territories at this time was slightly under 17,000.76 
Such concerns prompted the Canadian government to limit further American 
development, buy all American bases at the war’s end, and take full responsibility for any 
defensive strategies implemented in Canadian territory.77  Also, in 1946, Canada undertook 
Operation Muskox, an exercise intended to study problems of military transport and deployment 
in the upper Arctic; importantly, the 3,100 miles it planned to cover (largely routes never 
covered by vehicles before) would be a strong statement that Canada was in control of its 
Arctic.78  Despite imaginable technical difficulties, the operation was successful, and with 
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American and Soviet observers in tow, it sent the intended message.  Canadian media also took 
care to stipulate that though the Americans sent an observation party, “it was an all-Canadian 
venture.”79  It also significantly discounted the notion that the Arctic would be likely to see 
ground troop engagement – the severity of conditions encountered demonstrated the unlikelihood 
of that scenario – and future security concerns focused mainly on activity by planes and 
submarines. 
The Cold War brought new concerns as the Arctic became a likely route for bombers 
from the Soviet Union.  U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson intimated to President Truman 
some worry concerning “the gap between Alaska and Greenland.”80  Soon, American bombers 
found their way to the end of Canadian runways in the North, ready for a first or retaliatory 
strike, and American naval exercises were underway in the area, as well.81  Attempting to 
reassert sovereignty and show that it could effectively control and defend the North itself, 
Canada took over stewardship of the Alaska Highway from the United States.  By 1965, it had 
control of the Distant Early Warning Line airfields in Canada, as well.82  While it had not been 
initially proactive, the Canadian government now appeared to have the situation well in hand. 
 At this point, the spectre of the Northwest Passage loomed large as it had not for over a 
century.  In April 1967, the largest oil field in North America was discovered at Prudhoe Bay, 
Alaska.83  To bring the oil to market in the most efficient way, a group of U.S. oil companies 
bought the largest American oil tanker available, reinforced the structure, and outfitted it with an 
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icebreaking bow.84  The intent was to send the tanker, the Manhattan, from Prudhoe Bay to New 
York through the Northwest Passage, in a test voyage to determine the economic feasibility of a 
tanker route rather than constructing a pipeline.  The companies believed that, should the 
Manhattan successfully transit the Northwest Passage, “the test could result in the establishment 
of a new commercial shipping route through the Arctic region with broad implications for future 
Arctic development and international trade.”85  Such a statement of intent in and of itself was not 
a threat to Canada; were a significant shipping channel to open in Canadian waters, it might be 
beneficial to the nation.  However, a threat was perceived in the fact that America had yet to 
recognize Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage, but rather followed a 
strategy of invoking a variety of maritime laws in claiming that the passage was international 
water.  The situation was exacerbated when, shortly after the voyage of the Manhattan was 
announced, the U.S. government informed Canada that it intended to support the tanker by 
sending a U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, the Northwind, alongside.86  No Canadian permission 
was sought.  In order to avoid outright confrontation but still assert some measure of authority, 
Ottawa proposed that a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker, the John A. Macdonald, accompany 
the Manhattan and Northwind while they were in Canadian waters.87  Also not looking for open 
confrontation, the U.S. government apparently felt it was an offer they could not refuse.  
Additionally, a Canadian government observer went along on the Manhattan, and a group from 
the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development flew out to meet the ship 
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and welcome it to Canadian waters.88  Ultimately, the tanker successfully concluded its voyage, 
making it the first commercial ship to transit the Northwest Passage in centuries of attempts.89 
 While the Canadian government’s response to the Manhattan’s voyage was at first 
sluggish, the outcry of public opinion was not.  Even leftist groups, not typically noted for their 
strident nationalism, voiced marked opinions.  An article in the far left-wing periodical 
Communist Viewpoint entitled “A New Phase in the Struggle for Canadian Independence” 
warned, “underneath a seemingly calm atmosphere powerful forces are shaping up in opposition 
to U.S. domination of our country.”90  While this article reeked of the hyperbolic rhetoric of Karl 
Marx, it was not alone in its thought process. The young and left-leaning New Democratic party, 
convening for a conference in the wake of the Manhattan incident, mused over strategies to 
maintain and bolster Canadian independence, while even the government had to take note of 
threats to Canadian identity such as the Manhattan, with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
examining ways to limit American investment in the country.91  On a number of fronts, and 
across the political spetrum, the Canadian public was demanding more action than the 
deployment of government observers.  Closing the door after the proverbial horse, the Canadian 
government took decisive action, just after the Manhattan had departed Canadian waters.  In 
1970, Canada extended its territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles, no small gesture by any measure.92  
What followed, however, was historic.  The Canadian government passed the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), extending to the government the authority to take measures 
to prevent pollution in a zone that stretched 100 miles from all Canadian land above the 60th 
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parallel.93  Although this represented more functional control than absolute sovereignty, the 
intent of the bill was obvious, especially to the United States.  Even had the text of the act not 
made its target a matter of common knowledge, Canadian politicians willingly filled in the gap.  
The leader of the New Democratic party, expressing his party’s support for the act, went on 
record saying “we want to make it clear to our friends south of the border that we will not 
tolerate anyone pushing the Canadian Government around.”94  According to an official in the 
Canadian government, the AWPPA, along with the extension to a 12-mile territorial sea, “led to 
what may be one of the more acerbic exchanges in the history of diplomatic communications 
between the two countries.”95  The State Department declined to allow the contents of their 
registered protest to be made public, so it is up to the imagination of historical observers to 
determine the invective that likely flew toward Ottawa.96 
The Americans may have gotten much more than they bargained for in the response to 
the voyage of the Manhattan.  Legal scholars, weighing in during the days following the 
unanimous passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in the Canadian Parliament, 
concluded that it was a legally enforceable act which gave Canada excellent title to stewardship 
of the waters of the Arctic region.97  Further bolstering Canada’s case, Queen Elizabeth visited 
the Arctic in July of 1970, and gave in a radio address what was described as one of her strongest 
supporting statements ever, affirming that Canada should stay the course in attempting to enforce 
pollution controls in the Arctic, for the good of the entire planet.98 
                                                
93 Ibid., 87. 
94 Edward Cowan, “Canada Expresses New Nationalism,” New York Times, April 19, 1970. 
95 Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic, 84. 
96 Cowan, “Canada Expresses New Nationalism.” 
97 “Profs Say Arctic Claim is Legal,” Toronto Daily Star, April 25, 1970. 
98 Allan Dickie, “Queen Declares Arctic Controls Vital to World,” Toronto Daily Star, July 10, 1970. 
 Gilman 29 
 The Manhattan crisis took place in the midst of an upswing in Canadian patriotism and 
nationalism, tied to a growing attempt by the government to foster a sense of a discrete national 
identity.  The year 1967 marked 100 years since confederation, and a number of developments 
intensified this.  One of the most notable was the adoption of a new Canadian flag, the maple leaf 
flag, in 1965.  This replaced the Red Canadian ensign that had represented the country for almost 
a century, and removed any obvious vestiges of British rule from the flag of Canada.  This action 
occurred against a background of social transformation that pervaded parts of the country, 
particularly Quebec, where a “Quiet Revolution” developed, with forces coalescing on either the 
side of federalism or of separatism.  The cumulative effect of such events was to deepen the 
desire of many Canadians for a more coherent and pronounced sense of national identity.  While 
there was uncertainty about the ultimate direction this would take, there was universal agreement 
on one tenet: it was diametric in its un-American nature.  Canadian philosophers have pointed 
out differences in historical formation, ethnographic composition, and other factors to account 
for a national outlook that stands in stark contrast to America’s, but there is another component, 
as well.99 
Aside from philosophical differences leading to such distinctions as vastly different 
social models, there is an oft-expressed fear shared by many Canadians that American hegemony 
will attempt to ensnare their nation and rob it of its rights and its resources.  This view saw itself 
expressed in the sensationalized coverage of the transgressions of the Byrd-MacMillan 
expedition in Canadian media in 1925, again in Prime Minister King’s privately articulated fears 
following World War II, and yet again in the outcry that surrounded the Manhattan.  
Unknowingly, the tanker sailed straight into the storm of Canadian fears that had been 
developing for almost a century.  This contributed to the perception that the U.S. was attempting 
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to weaken Canadian control or claims to its land or water.  As the Toronto Daily Star editors 
mused in 1969, in addition to “ensuring safe navigation and prevent[ing] pollution,” the response 
to the Manhattan was “a matter of national dignity and prestige.”100  Another concerned citizen 
wrote that “it is time for Canadian citizens to express themselves… clearly enough that for the 
rulers of both the United States and Canada to know that we feel the U.S. has gone too far… the 
U.S. is simply trying to add to its century-old Manifest Destiny policy… this is pure 
imperialism.”101  This goes a long way toward explaining what otherwise might seem a 
hyperbolic reaction to the voyage of a single ship.  What that ship symbolized to many 
Canadians was much more significant.  It was a potential attempt to dilute their control of the 
Arctic, a region that was by this point beginning to be viewed as uniquely Canadian resource and 
source of national pride. 
 After the voyage of the Manhattan, the matter of Arctic sovereignty largely rested for the 
next fifteen years.  Throughout the period, there were occasional exchanges about the passage of 
American nuclear submarines under the Arctic without Canadian permission, and similar 
concerns about Soviet subs, but nothing substantial developed.  That all changed in 1985, when 
the American government announced its intent to send the Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea 
through the Northwest Passage.102  The vessel was located in Greenland and the shortest route 
for its return to its homeport was through Canadian (claimed) waters.  The U.S. government, 
desiring to avoid an implied endorsement of Canadian sovereignty in the area, refused to ask 
permission to enter the Passage, maintaining that it was an international strait.  Canada, not to be 
ignored, granted the required permission the day before the Polar Sea was to enter the 
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Passage.103  Additionally, it sent the John A. Macdonald to accompany the Polar Sea halfway 
through the passage, and to transfer two Canadian Coast Guard captains to the American ship.  
Further, an official from the Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs joined the Polar Sea later in 
its voyage.104  Canada may have been unwilling to take decisive action to stop unauthorized 
transits of the Passage by the United States, but it was determined to oversee them.  Canadian 
aircraft also kept a watchful eye on the Polar Sea.105  One, in particular, made clear the feelings 
of the Canadian people; a nationalist group flew over the Polar Sea several times, dropping a 
Canadian flag and a message informing the U.S. ship that it should perform an about turn and 
remove itself from Canadian waters. 106 
 In the wake of the Polar Sea incident, the Canadian government had several responses to 
the Americans, not including the general public outcry.  In nationalistic fervor, plans were 
considered to block American ships and submarines (also Soviet) from the Arctic.  Patrol aircraft 
and helicopters became a priority, and the idea of an arctic sonar surveillance network was 
bandied about.  Also seriously discussed for a very brief period was the mining of the Arctic (no 
mention of how this would coincide with Canada’s previous environmental protection 
mandate).107  More concretely, however, the government finally decided to use a method of 
drawing borders that had wider acceptance than sector theory.  It opted to use straight baselines, 
or borderlines drawn from point to point, in conjunction with the low-water line, in order to 
enclose its territory.108  What affect this had on access to the maritime passages in dispute, 
though, is questionable. 
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 Not unlike the Manhattan incident, the Polar Sea picked a rather poor time to raise issues 
of Canadian sovereignty, for in the mid-1980s Canadian identity and nationalism were again 
intensifying.  One trigger for this was the Canada Act of 1982.  Passed by the British Parliament, 
it provided for the patriation of Canada’s constitution, and was the last step in a process to give 
Canada complete legislative independence, making it entirely autonomous and equal in stature to 
the United Kingdom in any substantial sense.  This only served to whet the fervor of nationalistic 
Canadians, who, as can be seen, were more vocal (and confrontational) during the passage of the 
Polar Sea.  The change over time as the issue gained more recognition by the public is also 
telling.  A Gallup poll taken in 1985 showed that 49% of Canadians felt that the Northwest 
Passage was owned by Canada.  Among those polled who were familiar with the Polar Sea 
incident, however, that figure rose to 70%.109  By 1987, a similar Gallup poll showed that 85% of 
Canadians, after watching the much-publicized interactions between the American and Canadian 
governments, believed that Canada owned the Northwest Passage.110 
 In 1988, it seemed that matters might finally rest.  America and Canada signed the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement, pledging to use their icebreakers to aid navigation in Arctic waters.  
The United States also agreed to seek Canadian consent before sending icebreakers through 
waters Canada considers internal.111  Notably, the agreement did not cover U.S. submarines, 
warships, or vessels owned by private interests, which basically comprise the entire list of 
vessels that ever created issues in the first place.112  Nevertheless, the agreement demonstrated 
that the United States would yield somewhat to the passions of public opinion that demanded 
that Canadian sovereignty receive some lip service, though only insofar as U.S. interests were 
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not affected, so there remains a question of exactly what “sovereignty” that truly represents for 
Canada. 
 Why a single game of football played atop the North Pole should have such import for 
many Canadians is now eminently understandable.  The current government in Canada has for 
years made a promise to protect Arctic sovereignty a cornerstone of its policy.  The U.S. 
submarine Charlotte surfacing at the North Pole in 2005, with a high probability that it had 
transited Canadian waters without announcing itself, understandably inflamed the passions of a 
public familiar with a long ling of perceived American usurpations.  This revived debate over the 
installation of an Arctic sensor grid that remains ongoing to this day, and there are also plans, 
which have existed in one form or another since the passage of the Manhattan, to build a fleet of 
Arctic-capable Canadian icebreakers to more effectively assert Canadian sovereignty in the 
region.  Global climate change is also playing a role, as melting polar ice means that the 
Northwest Passage will be a reality for normally equipped ships within the foreseeable future.  
Anticipating this, the Canadian government has instituted a requirement that all ships transiting 
the Northwest Passage register with the Canadian government, a policy that has yet to meet with 
a serious American challenge, but almost undoubtedly will. 
 The history of Canadian Arctic sovereignty shows a consistent record of confrontation 
with the United States.  Indeed, it might even be argued that this confrontation was the key to the 
formation of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty policy, which certainly happened in a highly reactive 
manner.  To recognize this fact is more important than ever, even as historical approaches to the 
topic gain new relevancy.  The environmental approach has garnered more attention as increased 
traffic in the Arctic threatens its unadulterated nature; indigenous rights have come into play 
more than ever before as proposed deepwater ports in predominantly native communities raise 
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questions of where control properly rests; generally improved accessibility to the region has 
opened up issues on new fronts both military and economic.  Other nations have also risen to 
confront Canadian control in the region, from Russia to various European states.  However, 
when looking at these present issues affecting Canadian Arctic sovereignty, it is critical to 
remember that the general fervor over Arctic sovereignty in the North can be traced for over a 
century to the actions and challenges of their neighbor south of the border.  An understanding of 
how Canada’s reactive, defensive sovereignty policies were derived goes a long way in 
explaining its actions and reactions at present. 
Another crucial recognition when considering Arctic sovereignty is the role of Canadian 
identity.  Many scholars have debated for decades about the nature of the dominant forces 
driving the creation of a Canadian identity, and while this is more of a psychological and 
ethnological project, it is worthy of note that many leading academics contend that a major 
component of Canadian identity can be found in its drawing of distinctions with the United 
States, as well as taking extreme caution concerning American actions that might infringe on 
Canadian sovereignty or independence.  The treatment of the Arctic sovereignty issue as a facet 
of the ongoing push by Canadians to develop an identity independent of their southern neighbor 
lends new understanding to the conflict.  Control of the Arctic certainly may have at best began 
as a mercenary calculation to gain control of more terra firma, but decades of confrontation with 
the United States gradually shifted the issue in the public’s opinion to one of maintaining an 
inimitable region and collection of resources as a wholly integral part of Canadian identity.  In 
2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper proclaimed that the history of the Arctic’s 
connection with the country “ha[s] planted the North deep in the Canadian soul. We live in a 
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northern country. We see ourselves as a northern people.”113  As the sovereignty issue has 
continued to be a significant issue between the United States and Canada, and promises to take 
on renewed international import in the near future, it is important to understand the historical 
context that drove the Arctic to become cherished by Canadians, and even a central part of their 
identity.  Perhaps only then will American policymakers understand why each renewed attempt 
they make to encroach upon or traverse the Arctic meets with renewed Canadian furor, and with 
this understanding, be able to work with their counterparts to the north toward further resolving 
what has been a contentious issue in Canada for most of that nation’s history. 
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